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ina PoliticalHierarchy:
AnInformational
StrategicAuditing
Modelof the
Decisions
SupremeCourt'sCertiorari
CHARLES M. CAMERON Columbia University
JEFFREY A. SEGAL SUNY at Stony Brook
DONALD SONGER Universityof South Carolina
He examine how the Supreme Court uses signals and indicesfrom lower courts to determinewhich
cases to review.In our game theoreticmodel, a higher court cues from publicly observablecase
facts, the knownpreferencesof a lower court, and its decision. The lower court attemptsto enforce
its own preferences,exploitingambiguityin cases'fact patterns. In equilibrium,a conservativehigher court
declines to review conservativedecisions from lower courts regardlessof the facts of the case or the relative
ideology of the judges. But a conservativehigher court probabilisticallyreviews liberal decisions, with the
"auditrate"tied to observablefacts and the ideology of the lower courtjudge. We derive comparativestatic
results and test them with a random sample of search-and-seizurecases appealed to the Burger Court
between 1972 and 1986. The evidence broadlysupports the model.
WT

ierarchical control of organizations is problematic throughout the realm of politics. Congress
and presidents attempt to control agencies,
upper levels of bureaucracies attempt to control lower
levels, and higher courts strive to control lower courts.
With incomplete information about their subordinates'
decisions and knowledge, superiors in rule-based hierarchies often employ some form of auditing. In this
article we study how the Supreme Court uses signals
and indices from lower courts to pluck a relative
handful of cases from a plethora of potential candidates for review. Our point of departure is the role of
review in enforcing the doctrinal preferences of the
Supreme Court within the judicial hierarchy.
We begin by presenting a game-theoretic model of
the Court's certiorari process. The model goes much
farther than earlier efforts to incorporate concepts
commonly employed by judicial scholars. For example,
we include the legal- concepts of case facts, doctrine,
and holding; formalize the attitudinal model; and
include an explicit role for judicial culture. Most important, the model puts asymmetric information at its
analytic center, following the hints in recent empirical
H
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studies based on interviews with justices of the Supreme Court and their clerks (Perry 1991).
The model explains several well-established patterns
in certiorari, such as the importance of amicus briefs by
the Solicitor General. It also generates several entirely
new and nonobvious predictions. We test the predictions on a random sample of 274 decisions in the area
of-search-and-seizure law heard in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals and appealed to the Supreme Court during
the Burger years. The data strongly display the patterns
predicted by the model. Thus, in addition to contributing to the certiorari literature, we hope to advance
the burgeoning literature on the strategic behavior of
courts (e.g., Caldeira and Wright 1988; Epstein and
Knight 1998; Hall 1992).
The article is organized as follows. We first discuss
the role of information in the certiorari process and the
place of certiorari decisions in the incentive system of
the judicial hierarchy. We then present the formal
model, followed by the empirical analysis. We next
discuss the implications of the findings and offer conclusions in the final section. All proofs are gathered in
the Appendix.

INFORMATIONAND INCENTIVES IN THE
CERTIORARI PROCESS
The Supreme Court's decision to hear a case-in legal
parlance, to grant certiorari-is perhaps the best studied area of the high court's decision making. A full
review of the literature is outside the scope of this
article and is unnecessary here, but it is helpful to
review several major themes relevant to these decisions.'
1 The Supreme Court uses the Rule of Four to grant certiorari, but
a majority is necessary to prevail on the merits. Presumably, forwardthinking justices take the latter into account when voting to grant
certiorari. Absent a careful analysis of the strategic properties of the
Rule of Four (to the best of our knowledge, no formal model of this
procedure has appeared in print), we treat the Court as a unitary
actor with respect to the lower courts.
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Certiorari and Incentives in the Judicial
Hierarchy
Certiorari and Interactive Incentives. The certiorari
system creates incentives for upper and lower courts
alike. One cannot get very far with a deductive theory
of certiorari without thinking about those incentives,
but a strange feature of the contemporary field of
judicial politics is that the literatures on certiorari
decisions and judicial compliance have developed
largely independently. Most of the empirical studies of
certiorari decisions ignore doctrinal deviations by
lower courts (we note some exceptions below). In turn,
empirical studies of the responsiveness of lower courts
to Supreme Court precedent typically ignore review
probabilities. In other words, there has been scant
appreciation of the fact that the certiorari process
creates an interactive incentive system between higher
and lower courts, with the behavior of appellate courts
affecting the behavior of the Supreme Court and vice
versa.
A partial exception is the empirical work of Ulmer
(1984), who used conflict with Supreme Court precedent as a predictor of certiorari, although he did not
recognize that the probability of certiorari is apt to
affect conflict with precedent. Ulmer noted that counsel for appellants seem to believe conflict with precedent galvanizes the Court into granting certiorari because such conflict is claimed in more than half of all
petitions (six or more conflicts were claimed in more
than 10% of the petitions). Attorneys may try to
manipulate this cue by padding their claims about
conflicts, so Ulmer tried to classify his sample into
cases that do and do not contain "real" conflict with
precedent. Using this distinction, he found that actual
conflict is the single most important variable for understanding grants of certiorari; it explains a higher
proportion of the variance than any of the other cues
noted by Tanenhaus et al. (1963) and other scholars.
Ulmer's subjective coding of conflict is not amenable
to replication, however. Moreover, his analysis puts
dated precedents and more recent ones on a par
although lower courts almost certainly defer more
conscientiously to the preferences of the contemporaneous Court. Finally, Ulmer's dichotomization of real
conflict leaves little room for nuance. Many scholars
recognize that conflict involves subtle gradations of
noncompliance (Feeney 1975). Nonetheless, one cannot read Ulmer's analysis without becoming aware of
certiorari as a tool for policing the doctrinal decisions
of lower courts.
Even if one accepts that certiorari creates an interactive incentive system, formalizing a model of it
requires answers to two more questions. What does
doctrinal compliance really mean? What sanctions and
rewards are available to the Supreme Court if it detects
noncompliance?
Doctrinal Compliance. The concept of a legal doctrine
is central to the process of legal reasoning. What is a
legal doctrine, and what does it mean to comply with a
doctrine?

We take as fundamental

the conception

implicit in classic descriptions of legal reasoning (e.g.,
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Levi 1948): A legal doctrine indicates which fact situations are to be grouped together and treated similarly.
In other words, it creates a set of equivalence classes in
a fact or case space (Kornhauser 1992). When a lower
court conforms to a legal doctrine, it accepts the
equivalence classes defined by the higher court and acts
in accordance with them. Nonconformity means that
the lower court treats the case inappropriately for the
class to which the case belongs. This concept of doctrine can be seen as an example of the broader notion
of rule-governed behavior, a phenomenon general to
bureaucracies. We formalize (part of) these conceptions of doctrine and doctrinal compliance below and
employ them in the empirical analysis.
Sticks, Carrots, and Culture. What sanctions or rewards can a higher court bring to bear on lower courts
that do not comply with its doctrine? In the American
system of jurisprudence, the formal answer is "very
few." Higher courts cannot promote, demote, or fire;
they cannot cut salaries, give bonuses, or offer stock
options. Thus, the Supreme Court possesses none of
the motivational tools typically employed by hierarchical superiors. This is one of the most striking features
of the federal judiciary considered as a hierarchical
organization.
A focus on traditional motivational tools is too
constricted a view of judges, however. In fact, two
sources of control are available to higher courts. First,
lower courts care about the disposition of cases: They
wish to see justice done, at least as they conceive it. If
a higher court reverses the decision of a lower court,
the latter may well view the ultimate disposition of the
case as much less attractive than if its judgment had
stood. Hence, reversal itself can be a kind of sanction,
at least for judges who care about the disposition of
cases. Second, informal sanctions supplement the formal rules. "Judicial culture" famously includes a desire
to avoid reversals. Frequent reversals bring the derision of colleagues and a decline in professional status.
Higher courts are well aware of this sanctioning power.
For example, Perry (1991, 267) notes that Supreme
Court clerks "frequently talked about the need to 'slap
the wrist' of a judge below." The importance of judicial
culture should not be surprising. Federal judges belong
to a very special and relatively close-knit society, and
their informal culture is apt to affect their decisions.
Enforcing Doctrine Versus Creating Doctrine. Our
model stresses the role of certiorari in enforcing doctrine, but this is a very partial view of the process.
Perhaps equally important is the selection of cases as
vehicles for creating new doctrine, for example, in
novel fact situations. These often occur in the context
of intercircuit conflict, when different circuits take
different positions on new issues, which the Court must
then answer. Indeed, the incremental, fact-soaked creation of new rules is one of the most interesting and
distinctive elements of judicial politics. The justices'
emphasis on finding "good" cases and "well-percolated" cases underscores this important part of the certiorari process (Perry 1991, chap. 8). In addition, the

model ignores aggressive grants, that is, situations in
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which the Supreme Court grants certiorari in order to
affirm a lower court decision and make it binding on
the entire nation.2
We defend the approach we take by noting that law
creation is an important part of certiorari, but modeling it involves even more complex theoretical issues
than the enforcement of doctrine, which is our focus.
The development and testing of a rigorous theory of
doctrinal enforcement is an important step toward a
more general theory of the judicial hierarchy.
Structureof the Hierarchy. Our analysis simplifies the
judicial structure into upper and lower courts. In
reality, the federal judicial hierarchy has three levels,
and courts at the first level play an important role in
fact-finding. Our simplified structure enables us to
explore the essential principal-agent dilemma. Extensions to this model could examine additional features
of the judicial hierarchy, such as the special role of trial
courts.

Information and Certiorari
From "CueTheory"to StrategicManipulation. Political
scientists have long recognized the central importance
of information in the Supreme Court's certiorari process. Tanenhaus et al. (1963) argue that the Court must
economize in its search for information, since each
year it is confronted with a blizzard of cases and tens of
thousands of pages of documents. In particular, they
argue, the Court is apt to rely heavily on easily distinguishable but highly informative "cues," such as splits
in the lower court, to winnow out the potential cases of
interest.
Tanenhaus's cue theory, as it came to be known,
provoked a flurry of empirical work that continues to
this day. Studies tried to determine which cues the
Court uses (if any), whether cues are dispositive or
merely suggestive, and whether the Court's use of cues
changes over time- (Armstrong and Johnson 1982;
Teger and Kosinski 1980). Development of the underlying theory of information acquisition received little
attention, however. Consequently, scholars largely ignored the strategic manipulation of cues, although they
soon recognized the importance of reputation in the
behavior of the Solicitor General (Caldeira and Wright
1988; Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984).
The neglect of the strategic dimension of cue theory
began to change when Caldeira and Wright (1988)
demonstrated the effect of amicus briefs on the probability of granting certiorari.3 When coupled with new
findings about the litigation strategies of interest
groups, Caldeira and Wright's finding strongly suggests
that at least one cue, the presence of an amicus brief,
Overall, 23.3% of the search-and-seizure cases were affirmedby the
Burger Court (U.S. Supreme Court database, using orally argued
citation and split vote as the unit of analysis). Some of these
affirmations may be consistent with our model. That is, because of
differences between the observed and actual intrusiveness of the
search, the Court may take a case that seems suspect only to find on
further review that it was correctly decided.
3 Cue theory aside, strategic analyses of certiorari date to Schubert
1959; also see Brenner 1979.
2
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is deliberately manipulated by interested parties in
order to affect the behavior of the Court (Epstein
1991). This move to greater theoretical sophistication
continued in Perry's (1991) landmark study of the
certiorari process. Perry adopted concepts from Jervis's
(1970) classic work on signaling in international relations, including the distinction between signals, which
are manipulable, and indices, which are not. Nonetheless, Perry did not address many of the issues that
occupy center stage in game-theoretic accounts of
signaling.
Meaning and credibility in certiorari signaling. Contemporary signaling theory revolves around two issues:
meaning and credibility (Banks 1991; Farrell 1993).
With respect to meaning, the key issues are the identity
of the signal sender, the nature of his or her private
information, and the interpretation of the message by
the signal receiver. In the context of certiorari, the
obvious questions are: Who is the signaler? What does
the signaler know that the Supreme Court does not?
What signals might reflect this private information?
How can the Court understand or interpret the signal?
With respect to credibility, the key issue is sometimes
called "the Jervis paradox": If sending a particular
message benefits a signaler with private information,
then why do not others without the information do the
sajne thing? If they do, then why does this not destroy
the credibility of the message? In the context of
certiorari, if a lower court that follows Supreme Court
doctrine can signal its conformance by sending a
particular message, then why do not courts who flout
doctrine send the same signal? If they do, how can the
signal from the first court credibly convey the intended
message: "There is no need to review me since I am
conforming to your doctrine"? The contemporary theory of signaling games provides powerful tools for
answering these questions.

A JUDICIAL SIGNALING GAME
The Model
Our model shares some similarities with other auditing
models in the social sciences, such as the importance of
mixed strategy equilibria, but its structure differs from
most others in three ways: It includes a publicly observable index, the message space for the signaler is
restricted to two actions, and both actors agree about
the disposition of some cases even when they differ
strongly about others. Consequently, the equilibria in
our model also differ in some regards from most others
(for a review of those models and their characteristics,
see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998).
The players are higher court H and lower court L.
Play of the game determines the legal disposition of a
search-and-seizure case. A "case" is a set of facts (i.e.,
a point in a fact space). Each point in the fact space
corresponds to a degree of intrusiveness of the search.
That is, points in the fact space map into the real line
X, where each point x indicates a degree of intrusiveness. Each case thus corresponds to a point x in X.
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Some of the facts in a case are publicly observable,
others are not. For example, it is easily determined
whether a search took place in a car or home, or
whether a warrant was issued; whether the police had
"probable cause" for the search is a more difficult
determination that can only be reached after careful
review of evidence and testimony.
Let x = x + t, where x is the intrusiveness of the case
based on the publicly observed facts, and t is an
additional increment or decrement of intrusiveness
based on the nonpublicly observable facts. We assume
t E T = X and is distributed according to distribution
F, with common knowledge density f assumed everywhere continuous, differentiable, and nonzero. We
assume throughout that F is log concave (displays the
monotone hazard rate property). This condition is met
by most common probability distributions, including
the normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential, and
Laplace (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989). We further
assume the density f(t) is independent of the realization of x.
Sequence of Play, Information Structure,and Strategies.
The lower court hears the case, learns all the facts in
the matter (i.e., it learns x and t and hence x), and
either admits or excludes the evidence. The higher
court sees only the publicly observable facts (i.e., it
learns x but not t) and the decision of the lower court.
H may deny certiorari (i.e., decline to review the case),
and L's decision stands. Or, at cost k, H may review the
case, learn the private information t, and affirm or
reverse L.
Given this information structure, the action of L
becomes a "signal" about its private information, exactly as noted by Songer (1979), while the publicly
observable degree of intrusiveness becomes an "index"
in Perry's terminology.
A strategy for L is a function
s:T XKX->z(M),
where zXQ)denotes the set of probability distributions
over a finite set, and M = {ml, m2}, with m1 =
exclude and m2 = admit. Thus, s (t; x) gives the
probability of excluding the evidence given the private
information t and the public information x.
If H hears the case it will affirm or reverse L in such
a way that the evidence is admitted or excluded according to its own preferred doctrine. Hence, we can take
H's strategy as simply a reviewing or auditing strategy:
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H, L. Court i believes the evidence should be excluded
in cases that are more intrusive than xi and admitted in
cases less intrusive than xi. This captures the notion of
a legal rule or doctrine and the "correct" versus
"incorrect" dispositions of cases, concepts of critical
importance in the judicial setting. Each court wishes to
decide cases correctly in view of its preferred legal rule.
Note, however, that the two courts differ in the value of
the ideal doctrinal cut-point. The reason courts prefer
different legal rules is not modeled here, but it could
result, for example, from different perceptions of the
social costs and benefits of curbing the police.
The unidimensional space X is exactly the "attitude"
space of the "attitudinal model" assumed in many
empirical studies of judicial decision making (Segal and
Spaeth 1993). The ideal cut-point partitions the space
in precisely the fashion noted in attitudinal studies.
This partitioning, combined with the mapping from the
n-dimensional fact space into the unidimensional attitude space, in turn partitions the fact space in exactly
the way required by the concept of a judicial doctrine.
Conveniently, however, most of the action of the model
takes place in the simple attitude space.
To complete the specification of the doctrinal component of preferences, we normalize each player's
payoffs. If a case is decided correctly from its perspective, then the court receives a payoff of 0; if incorrectly,
the payoff is -1. This stylization reflects the different
value of a correct versus an incorrect decision to the
courts while simplifying the development and exposition of the model. In the interest of brevity and clarity
in presentation, we take XL < XH SO that H is more
conservative than L; results concerning the other,
completely symmetrical, case are noted where appropriate.
In addition to preferences about outcomes, L prefers
not to be reversed. If reversed, it suffers an ? > 0 utility
loss; this loss reflects the influence of judicial culture.
We do not try to account for the origin or maintenance
of this loss, although one can view it as sustained
through repeated play within the legal community.
Finally, the higher court loses k E (0, 1) if it hears the
case.4 This auditing cost reflects the time and effort of
hearing the case, which involves a cost in other cases
unheard and in leisure and other activities forgone.
Given the normalization of the payoffs, ? and k can be
seen as the utility losses from reversal and auditing
relativeto the utility loss of an incorrectly decided case.
The utility function for the higher court is thus:
UH

r :M X X i\ A(A),

where A = {a,, a2}, with a1 = grant certiorari and a2
= deny certiorari. Thus, r(nmi;x) is the probability of
granting certiorari given action mi by L and the
observable degree of intrusiveness x.

fX

i

<XH

XHand

X

X < XH
?X

Preferences. Both courts have preferences defined
partly in relation to the ultimate disposition of the case.
Each wishes the case to be adjudicated correctly, given
its own notions of justice. More specifically, each has a
preferred legal rule, which uses a cut-point xi in X, i -
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and m = admit and a = deny

XH

m = exclude and a

deny

and m = exclude and a = deny
and m = admit and a = deny

-k if a = grant
4 We bound the auditing cost by 1; otherwise, the higher court would
never find it profitable to review cases (since the most it can gain as
a result, exclusive of the auditing cost, is 1).
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case, a sufficiently imposing chance of reversal will
keep L from pursuing her ideal policy. For cases that
UL
fall into the conflict region, the role of reversal costs is
critical; as the cost of reversal falls to zero, the probaIX
<XL
and
m = admit
bility of an audit must go to one if the lower court is to
O if
XL < X < XH and m = exclude and a = deny
be dissuaded from implementing its own preferred
doctrine.
(X 2 XH and m = exclude
Finally, note that for any set of observable facts x it
and m = exclude and a = deny
(X <XL
is possible for L to have the best response "admit" or
"exclude" (since by assumption F(ta) > 0 and 1 m = admit
-1 if
XLx X<XHand
-).
This
F(tb) > 0, where ta
XL - X and tb XH.
LX2? XH and m = admit and a = deny
has an important implication: All information sets can
-1 - C if XL < X < XH and m = exclude and a = grant be reached in equilibrium, so the need to determine
beliefs at unreached information sets does not arise.
I X <XL
and m = exclude and a = grant
Let [>(x; m , x) denote H's beliefs about x given the
-? if
X 2 XH and m = admit and a = grant
observable facts x, L's action m , and L's strategy. For
example, >(x < XH; admit, x') indicates thelprobability
H puts on x lying below XH after observing "admit" in
Expected Utilities and Best Responses. The expected
a case with observable obtrusiveness x'. The following
utility for the lower court from strategy s (t; x) follows
fact is important: Given L's best-response corresponstraightforwardly:
dence, H's beliefs about x must be concentrated on the
UL(s(t;
0))
region belowxH after having observed "admit,"regardless
of the value of x. Therefore, after observing
if X < XL
-1]
s (t; x^)[r(mj;x) ( 1"admit," the expected utility to H of review strategy
=
r(mi; x)(1 + 0)] - 1 if XL ?X <XH
(t; x)r(admit, x) must be -r( )k. This expression is maximized at r(admit, x) = 0 for all x. Accordingly, in any
1
if
) (1 O] x ' XH.
(1 s(t; x))[r(m2;
equilibrium, r(admit; x) = 0 for all x.
L's best-response correspondence is immediate:
In addition, given L's best-response correspondence,
H's belief about x must be concentrated above XL
BRL(r(m; x^), t; x^)
following the observation of "exclude," regardless of
the
value of x. Recall that the payoff to H from denying
(X <XLL
certiorari
given exclusion is zero if x - XH but -1 if x <
S(t; f)=O0 ifX ?XL
< X < XH and r(m1; ) > P
XH. Therefore, following the observation of "exclude,"
the expected utility to H of review strategy r(exclude, x)
=
s(t; 0) E [0, 1] if XL < X < XH and r(mi; x) = p
is for all x
? XH
fX
X:-X
s(t;X) = 1 if
? X < XH and r(m1; 0) < p,
xXL
-r(exclude, x)k - (1 - r(exclude, X))P(XL ? X
and for the lower court:

=

where p 1/(1 + 4
L's best response correspondence indicates there are
three strategically distinct regions in X: the region
below XL, the region between XL (inclusive) and XH,
and the region above XH (inclusive). If x falls into the
first region, then L always admits the evidence; if x falls
into the third region, then L always excludes the
evidence; if x falls into the second region, the "conflict
region," then L admits or excludes the evidence depending on whether the probability of certiorari (given
exclusion and the observable facts) falls above or below
a critical value p. If x falls into the conflict region and
the probability of certiorari equals p, then L is indifferent between admitting and excluding the evidence
and may randomize between the two pure strategies in
any fashion.
This best-response correspondence is quite intuitive.
The interests of the two players correspond when x is
very high or very low (i.e., at or above H's ideal
cut-point or below L's). Therefore, when x falls into
those regions L can pursue her ideal policy without
fear of reversal, yielding L a best response that is
invariant to H's strategy. When x falls into the conflict
region, the interests of the players are opposed. In this

< XH,

(1)

exclude, x),

where, from Bayes's rule,
>.(XL

< X < XH,

exclude, x)

tb

s(Q + t)f(t)dt

I
ta

rtb

s

+

1 -F(tb)

+ t)f(t) dt

ta

(recall thatXL = x + ta and XH = X + tb). The solution
to maximizing expression 1 with respect to r(exclude, x)
depends on the relative magnitudes of k and V(xL ?
X < XH, exclude, x). Thus, in any equilibrium, for all x
r1

r(exclude;

x) =

if

>L(XL ?X

OtE [0, 1] if
10if

(XL '

< XH) >

<XH)

>.(XL-X
X<H)

k

<

=

k

k.
(2)
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Equilibria
We seek perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) to the
judicial signaling game. In doing so it is convenient to
consider a level of x, x*, such that H's posterior belief
about the true location of the case, given observed x
and "exclude" by L, leave him just indifferent between
granting and denying certiorari, even if L definitely
excludes the evidence for all cases truly lying in the
conflict region (i.e., even if s(t, x) = 1 V x E [XL, XH)).
Using the middle part of equation 2 and Bayes's rule,
x is implicitly defined as the level of x such that
F(tb) - F(ta)
1

3

=k

-F(ta)

Note that x* may not exist if k is sufficiently large, that
is, if the left-hand quantity in equation 3 is less than k
for all values of X. If x* does exist, then the assumption
of log concavity of FQ) assures that it will be unique.
PROPOSITION1.

1. If x* does not exist, then the following is a unique
PBE:
0O if x < XL

s(t, ) =

1 otherwise

r(m, x) = OV m and V x
and beliefs are determined everywhereby Bayes's
rule.
2. If x* exists, then the PBE are characterizedby:
s*(t, x)
(X

>f
-

XH

{x-XLand

x-x*

(t, k) E [0, 1] such that >(xL
x) = k if xL
Oif x

x <

< X < XH,

exclude,

xHand x < x*

< XL

1
r*(mik) =t
r*(mi,
x)

~

ifxf < x* and mi = exclude
m=
and mi = exclude
(x-x
f
mi = admit

and beliefs are determined everywhereby Bayes's
rule.5

Part 2 of the proposition allows a great deal of
latitude in admissable strategies for L. The latitude
arises for cases whose observable intrusiveness is below
x and whose true location lies within the conflict
region. Hence, part 2 describes many equilibria. In all
these equilibria, however, H's posterior belief that x
lies in the conflict region, after observing "exclude" and
x, must exactly equal k. In this sense, all of L's
strategies characterized in part 2 can be said to be
5 Recall that the proposition assumes the higher court is more

conservative than the lower court. There is a "mirror" proposition
when the higher court is more liberal than the lower court.
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"belief equivalent." All would be observationally equivalent to an outside observer not privy to t.
Example. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the review
equilibria in part 2 of the proposition is through an
example. SupposeXL = OXH = 1, k = 1/2, e = 1/2, and
f is a normal distribution with mean zero and standard
deviation 1. In this example, if x < x, then s(t, x) =
s(t', x) V x E [XL, XH). In other words, if a case lies in
x* , then L keys the
the conflict region and x'
probability of excluding the evidence only on the case's
observed intrusiveness.
Consider the strategy of the lower court, shown in
XH,
the left-hand panel of Figure 1. If x < XL or x
then the lower court has obvious actions regardless of
the value of x. Whenx < XL, the lower court admits the
evidence; when x - XH, the lower court definitely
excludes the evidence. It can do so because even if
audited it will not be reversed. If x falls into the conflict
region, then L's strategy depends on the value of x, the
publicly observable level of intrusiveness. When x is
sufficiently high, at or above the critical level x* (which
can be calculated to be about .69 in this example), the
high court will not review the case even given exclusion
of the evidence, for reasons explained below. Given
this, the lower court can implement its preferred
doctrine and exclude the evidence. When x is lower
than x*, the lower court uses a probabilistic strategy
keyed to the observable facts. For instance, when x =
.3, the probability of excluding the evidence is about
.64.
Now consider the strategy of the higher court. If it
observes the admission of the evidence, then it accepts
the lower court's judgment. This follows from the fact
that L is more liberal than H, so any evidence it finds
admissible will surely be found admissible by H as well.
The higher court has a more difficult decision if it
observes the exclusion of the evidence (the right-hand
panel of Figure 1). If the true situation is x - XH, then
H would like L's judgment to stand and would prefer
not to review the case. But if x < XH, then H would like
to review the case and reverses L, even though granting certiorari entails cost k. Unfortunately for the
higher court, it can only observe x and the fact of
exclusion. So, given the observable degree of intrusiveness, the two ideal doctrinal cut-points, the cost of
auditing, and the probability distribution F(t), the
higher court must decide whether it is worthwhile to
check the lower court after observing "exclude." When
x is large enough (equal to or greater than x *), it will
not be worthwhile; that is, the probability that x truly
falls into the conflict region between the two doctrinal
cut-points will not be large enough to warrant the
audit. When x < x*, the higher court's calculation goes
the other way. When H observes "exclude" from a
liberal lower court, it employs a probabilistic auditing
strategy keyed to the value of ?. In this case, the
probability of granting certiorari after observing "exclude" is 2/3.
These strategies of the two players together determine outcomes. For example, if the liberal lower court
admits the evidence, then the higher court does not
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grant certiorari, and the lower court's decision stands.
If the lower court excludes the evidence and x < .69,
then the higher court grants certiorari with a 2/3 chance.
In the event of certiorari, if x actually falls in the
conflict region, then H reverses L; if it does not fall in
that region, then H affirms. (Note that the model
predicts some grants and affirms as well as grants and
reversals.) For instance, when x falls into the conflict
region and x = .2, L admits the evidence with a 42%
chance and excludes it with a 58% chance; if it excludes, then H denies certiorari with a 33% chance, so
the judgment stands, and grants certiorari with a 67%
chance; if it so grants, then H reverses L. Finally, when
x - .69, L decides the case according to its own
preferred doctrine, and H always denies certiorari,
even if L excluded the evidence.
Meaning and Credibility. How do meaning and credibility play out in the model? The signals "admit" or
"exclude" are inherently ambiguous, since x lies on a
continuum, but the messages are dichotomous (i.e., the
most informative equilibrium can only be a partial
pooling equilibrium). Because L is liberal, however,
the meaning of the signal "admit" (i.e., x < XH) is
sufficiently clear to make H's decision easy, provided
the message is credible; indeed, the message is perfectly credible when L is more liberal than H. The
signal "exclude" from L is also ambiguous, with more
serious ramifications for H. A liberal lower court
always (weakly) prefers the higher court to interpret
"exclude" as meaning x ? XH, but this interpretation
cannot be inherently credible because of the potential
tension between the two courts. Instead, H uses an
index, the observable degree of intrusiveness, to judge

0

6
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the message credibility: If the observable facts indicate
intrusiveness above the critical threshold x *, then the
interpretation x > XH iS sufficiently credible to warrant
accepting L's decision. If not, then H will occasionally
audit L. The audit rate will be keyed to the lower
court's sensitivity to reversals, and sensitive courts will
be audited less frequently than insensitive ones.

Hypotheses

about Review

Because the model treats certiorari as part of an
interactive incentive system, it generates hypotheses
not only about the probability of review but also about
the exclusion of evidence in the lower court. Both types
of hypotheses can be used to test the model; because
our primary interest is the certiorari decision, we focus
on the former.
The first two hypotheses follow straightforwardly
from the propositions but make explicit the consequences of a lower court that is more conservative than
the higher court.
(liberal admission or conservative exclusion). Theprobabilitythe higher court grants certiorari
is zero if XL < XH and the lower court admits the
evidence, or XL > XHand the lower court excludes the
evidence.

HYPOTHESIS 1

(liberal exclusion or conservative admission). (a) If XL < XHand the lower court excludes the
evidence, then the probability the higher court grants
certiorariis zero only if the search is sufficientlyintrusive (kx-*); (b) if XL > xH and the lower court admits
the evidence, then the probability the higher court

HYPOTHESIS 2
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grants certiorariis zero only if the search is sufficiently
unintrusive (k < x*).
A striking feature of these hypotheses, which are
new to the literature, is the way the higher court's
behavior depends on the lower court preferences relative to the higher court. The asymmetry of H's response
to, say, "admit" arises because the meaning of the
signal depends on the nature of the sender (a liberal or
conservative lower court).6 These propositions-particularly the first, which might be called the Nixon goes
to China proposition-are strongly reminiscent of Calvert's (1985) work on the value of information from a
biased source ("if a cold warrior like Nixon goes to
China it must be time for a change in American
policy").
Now consider two circuit courts, both more liberal
than the Supreme Court but one less liberal than the
other. How does the critical value of the index I *, the
level of intrusiveness above which the Supreme Court
does not review even following "exclude," differ for the
two courts? This question is answered by the third
hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3

(proximity of lower court). Consider two
lower courts. (a) If XL < xHfor both lower courts, then
(i) the critical value x* is lowerfor the less liberallower
court, and (ii) the probability of review is (weakly)
lowerfor that courtgiven the same observablefacts and
actions. (b) If XL > XH for both lower courts, then (i)
the critical value x* is lowerfor the more conservative
lower court, and (ii) the probabilityof reviewis (weakly) greaterfor that courtgiven the same observablefacts
and actions.

Hypothesis 3 indicates that moving a lower court
closer to the higher court expands the region in which
cases escape review, a sensible result. Hypothesis 3 also
indicates that if one estimates the probability of review
as a function of observable facts and the ideological
distance between the higher and lower court, then the
coefficient on the distance between the two courts'
ideologies should be positive. This hypothesis is new to
the literature.
HYPOTHESIS4

(change in high court'spreferences). (a) As
the court becomes more conservative or more liberal,
x moves in the same direction (e.g., if XH increases,
then x* increases). Consequently, (b) as the higher
court becomes more conservative, cases from liberal
lower courts become (weakly) more likely to be reviewed (controlling for observable facts), and cases
from conservative lower courts become (weakly) less
likely to be reviewed.

6

Referring to Figure 1, it may seem plausible to strengthen hypothesis 2 so that the probability of review, if nonzero, is a constant with
respect to observed facts. Yet, such a strengthening requires the
additional assumption that e is not only uncorrelated with the
distance between the courts but also identical across all lower courts.
Whether the probability of review, when positive, varies with respect
to observable facts can be seen as a test of this rather strong
assumption.
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Hypothesis 4 is closely related to hypothesis 3 and also
seems quite sensible, although it is new to the literature.
One of the most established facts about certiorari is
that amicus briefs and the involvement of the Solicitor
General greatly increase the probability the Supreme
Court will accept a case. A complete analysis of those
two factors would require modeling third-party signaling and is beyond our scope here. In a somewhat
similar model, however, Banks and Weingast (1992)
note that third-party signals can be seen as reducing
auditing costs. The following hypothesis considers the
effects of changes in the cost of review.
5 (change in the cost of review).A decrease
in the cost of review (a) increases x* if XL < XH and

HYPOTHESIS

decreases x* if

XL >

XH.

Consequently, (b) the proba-

bility of review (weakly) increases, controllingfor observable levels of intrusiveness.
This hypothesis offers one reason amicus briefs or
involvement of the Solicitor General may increase the
probability of certiorari: They reduce information costs
for the Supreme Court.
Hypothesis 5 and the no-review equilibrium in part 1
of proposition 1 have an interesting implication. When
the Supreme Court has little interest in a technically
demanding area (such as admiralty or patent law), the
value of k will be large, and the Court will largely or
entirely abandon that area. For instance, during the
last 50 years the Court has only rarely heard admiralty
cases, once a substantial portion of its caseload. Conversely, when the Court has a substantial interest in a
less technically demanding area (e.g., civil liberties),
hypothesis 5 suggests it is likely to hear many such
cases. The topic seems to act as a "cue" for the Court,
though in fact the causal mechanism is not so much
signaling as the magnitude of information costs relative
to the possible gains from review. The importance of
this type of cue is a recurrent finding in the literature.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data
The data for this analysis were assembled as follows. As
part of a larger project on circuit court decision
making, we drew a random sample of U.S. Courts of
Appeals search-and-seizure opinions (including per
curiams) published in the Federal Reporter from 1961
through 1990. We determined the universe of these
cases by searching Westlaw (www.westlaw.com) for all
"searches and seizures," all Fourth Amendment cases,
and criminal law topics 219, 226, 364, 394, and 207, plus
relevant combinations of keywords. From this universe
we then drew a random sample stratified by year,
consisting of 40 cases per year. Any that were not in
fact search-and-seizure cases were discarded and replaced with the next case from the universe. For years
with less than 40 cases, all published cases were included in the sample.
The original sample of more than 1,100 published

appeals court decisions yielded only 18 cases reviewed
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by the Supreme Court. This is not surprising, given the
rarity of certiorari. Therefore, the next step was to add
all other appeals court search-and-seizure cases reviewed by the high court. Such a sample, known as a
choice-based sample, is commonly used when the event
of interest is rare. Special statistical techniques are
required for such samples, to which we return shortly.
Each case in the final sample was coded in various
ways: whether the appeals court upheld or struck down
the search, whether the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court, whether certiorari was granted, and so
on. We also coded fact patterns for each case using the
procedures employed by Segal (1984). The identity and
votes of each judge on the appellate court panel were
also recorded. Using the identity information, appeals
court judges were matched with data on their personal
background and characteristics (see Songer, Segal, and
Cameron 1994). Characteristics were unavailable for
some, since often district court judges and retired
judges sit as the third member of appellate court
panels. Personal characteristics were available for the
lead judge in most of the cases, however.
Our model indicates five key variables. The dependent variable is whether certiorari was granted (Grant).
The independent variables are the signal, that is,
whether the lower court admitted the evidence (Admit); an index, the publicly observable intrusiveness of
the search (Intrude);another index, the ideology of the
lower court (Ji); and the ideology of the Supreme
Court.
Using the case facts, we constructed the measure of
the publicly observable intrusiveness of the search in
the following way. Segal (1984) estimates the likelihood the Supreme Court will uphold a search, based on
the fact pattern in cases and a proxy for the ideology of
the Court. In particular, Segal estimates weights on
each variable using a logit regression. Since the Court's
decision to uphold or strike down search-and-seizure
cases depends partly on the intrusiveness involved, the
logit weights on case facts provide a convenient way to
measure intrusiveness.7 More specifically, we construct
the variable intrude as follows:
Int = -3.256 X Incident - 1.049 X Afterlaw + .06
X Unlawful

-

1.928 X Warrant + 3.25 X Home

+ 2.054 X Person + 2.733 X Business
X Car

-

+ 2.243

1.411 X Except + 1.766 x Extent.

The definitions for the case fact variables are identical
to those of Segal (1984), but we reverse the sign on the
variables, as we wish to measure intrusiveness rather
than lack of it. We also do not employ the constant or
Segal's proxy for Supreme Court ideology, since we
wish to measure intrusiveness rather than probability
of upholding or reversing. Furthermore, we do not
following equation provides the mapping from fact space to
attitude space discussed in the previous section. Whether this simple
linear mapping is adequate to capture important doctrinal subtleties
is an interesting question, but Segal's work demonstrates its empirical power.

7The

employ Segal's variable Probcaus, which indicates
whether the lower court found probable cause for the
search. We argue that, for the most part, findings about
probable cause do not reflect publicly observable facts
but the private information the lower court obtained
through its scrutiny of the case. It is exactly in its
determination of probable cause that a lower court can
try to exploit its informational advantage to alter the
outcome of a search-and-seizure case in its preferred
direction. It is worth noting that lower court determinations of probable cause do not affect the Supreme
Court's decision on the merits, according to Segal's
analysis (i.e., the coefficient on this variable was not
statistically different from zero). This makes perfect
sense from an informational standpoint: Once the
Supreme Court has heard a case, it can make its ruling
based on its own knowledge of previously unobservable
facts, not what the lower court says about them.
We created a measure of the doctrinal preferences
of the lower court in a two-step fashion, following
Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994).8 First, we regressed the votes of the appellate judges on their
background characteristics (e.g., whether they were
appointed by a Republican president or were a prosecutor before becoming a judge). The logit weights from
this regression were used to form an index of conservatism for each judge for whom background information was available (low numbers on the index indicate
a presumptively liberal judge; higher numbers a more
conservative one).9 This is obviously far from perfect as
a measure of doctrinal preferences. Nonetheless, presumptively conservative judges, based on simple background characteristics, tend to vote more often to
uphold searches relative to presumptively liberal
judges (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). Hence, the
index has a degree of face validity. Thus, the first stage
yields a measure of ideology for each judge on the
three-judge appellate panel.
The formal model assumes a single measure of
ideology for a lower court, an abstraction adopted to
simplify an already complex model. In the empirical
analysis, however, we have to consider how the Supreme Court may determine the ideology of the lower
court judges. Several possibilities present themselves.
Most obviously, the Court may cue off the ideology of
the opinion writer (measured by our variable J1); we
explore this possibility below. Or the Court may try to
judge the general ideological tenor of the lower court,
perhaps best reflected in the mean ideology of the
judges in the majority. Alternatively, the Court may use
its limited information very efficiently, cueing off the
See Brace, Hall, and Langer 1998 and Giles, Hettinger, and
Peppers 1998 for similar uses of regression-based techniques to
impute judicial ideologies.
9 The logit is .353 region - .311 appointingpresident + .381 religion +
.189 prosecutor + .152 judicial experience, defined as: judge's region
(1 = South, 0 = non-South), the appointing president's ideology (1 =
conservative [Tate and Handberg
liberal, 0 = moderate, -1
1991]), the judge's religion (1 Catholic, 0 = other), prosecutorial
experience (1 = yes, 0 = no), and judicial experience (1 = yes, 0 =
no). A simple index based on the number of presumptively conservative traits works almost as well as the multivariate regression in
predicting votes of appellate judges.
8
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most liberal judge in the majority in conservative
decisions and the most conservative judge in the majority in liberal decisions. Information about a dissenting judge, if any, also may be useful. Data limitations
prevent a detailed analysis of these possibilities.10
We control for the doctrinal preferences of the
Supreme Court in a simple way: We restrict our
attention to the last three natural courts (courts in
which there are no personnel changes) of the Burger
years (Burger Courts 3-5 in Table 5-2 of Epstein et al.
1997). That is, we examine cases from January 7, 1972,
to September 25, 1986 -from the addition to the Court
of William Rehnquist up to the addition of Antonin
Scalia-which yields 273 usable appealed cases. During
this period, in the arena of criminal justice the dominant coalition on the Court was relatively stable and
quite conservative. Moreover, the bulk of the appellate
court panels that the high court faced were almost
certainly more liberal than the Supreme Court, at least
with respect to search and seizure." This makes the
detection of relevant patterns in the data much easier.

Method
Hypotheses. The data allow us to address hypotheses
1-3 in the signaling model. Since the Burger Court was
almost certainly as conservative, if not more so, in
search-and-seizure cases as most of the lower court
panels it faced (Blasi 1983), the model predicts a series
of patterns that are neatly captured in the conditioning
plot shown in Figure 2. Such plots are powerful devices
for detecting interactions or (as is relevant in this case)
patterns across statistical regimes (Cleveland 1993).
The plot is read in the following way. Each panel shows
the relationship between the probability of granting
certiorari and the intrusiveness of the search, under a
specific condition. In the top two panels, the lower
court admitted the evidence. In the bottom two panels,
the lower court excluded the evidence. In the left-hand
panels (top and bottom), the judge who wrote the
opinion for the lower court was quite liberal. In the
right-hand panels, the judge who wrote the opinion for
the lower court was conservative (but, recall, less
conservative than the Supreme Court).
The signaling model predicts several patterns when
the data are arranged in this fashion (Figure 2). The
10Because data on district court and retired judges sitting by
designation were not available, more than one-third of our cases
would have to be excluded if we were to use a composite measure of
panel ideology. By focusing on the opinion writer, we cut missing
data to below 10%. Moreover, it is not unrealistic to imagine that the
Supreme Court cues off the opinion writer, especially as the justices'
certiorari memos typically highlight his or her name.
11To test whether the Court's decisions remained stable under Chief
Justice Burger, we added to the model dummy variables for each
chief justice from Warren through Rehnquist (minus one for the
excluded dummy) and an interaction for the presence of that chief
justice and each passing term of the Court from 1962 through 1991.
This, as we have previously shown, is the best measure of changing
search-and-seizure doctrine between Courts. Nevertheless, if we look
only within the Burger Court, we find that the coefficient for its
interaction is 0.06, with a standard error of 0.05. Thus, we are
reasonably confident in our assertion that under Burger, the Court's
preferences remained stable.
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top two panels should show a zero probability of review
at all levels of intrusiveness: If the lower court took the
conservative action, then the Burger Court should not
review it (from hypothesis 1). The prediction for the
lower panels is more complicated. Refer to the step
function in the right-hand panel of Figure 1. The
signaling model predicts such a step function in each of
the lower panels of Figure 2, but it should be located
farther to the right in the left-hand panel than in the
right-hand panel (hypothesis 3.a.i.), and it may be
beyond any level of intrusiveness actually observed. So,
at any value of intrusiveness, the probability of review
should be no greater in the lower right-hand panel than
the lower left-hand panel (hypothesis 3.a.2). Finally, in
the lower panels, if the probability of granting certiorari approaches zero, it should do so only for high
levels of intrusiveness (hypothesis 2).
Choice-Based Sampling. The estimated models need
to reflect the fact that the sample is choice based. This
is easily done by weighting the observations (see Manski and Lerman 1977; Greene 1991, Section 36.5,
provides a simple example). In the initial sample, the
proportion of appealed cases actually heard by the
Supreme Court was 5%. These were subsequently
oversampled, so that they account for about 27% of the
final sample. Consequently, cases granted appeal are
overrepresented by .27/.05 = 5.4, and cases not granted
review are underrepresented by .73/.95 = .77. To
account for this, the granted cases need to be weighted
by the factor .05/.27 = .19, and the rejected cases need
to be weighted by the factor .95/.73 = 1.3. In all the
models presented below, including the scatter plot
smoothers, this procedure was followed.
Data Display
Figure 3 displays all the data in the form of the critical
conditioning plot. Liberal lower courts are defined as
those whose ideology score (J1) is at or below the
median value (.152). To help uncover the systematic
variation in the data without imposing any pattern ex
ante, we include the fit from a nonparametric scatter
plot smoother.12 The outstanding patterns in the data
are clear, namely, the radical difference between cases
in which the evidence was admitted (the top row) and
those in which the evidence was excluded (the bottom
row). In the former, the probability of review is zero,
except at the very highest levels of intrusiveness, where
it appears to increase slightly. In the latter, the probability of review is never near zero, except for very
intrusive searches struck down by conservative courts.
Figure 3 uncovers another predicted pattern: The
probability of granting certiorari as a function of
intrusiveness is flat (or slightly increasing at high levels
of intrusiveness) when the lower court admits the
evidence; flat when liberal courts exclude the evidence;
12 In each panel the smoothing curve is a locally weighted lesss)
regression (span = 1) incorporating the Manski-Lerman weights.
Other smoothers yield similar patterns, and the results are not
particularly sensitive to the span of the regression. On these techniques, see Beck and Jackman 1998.
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and strongly decreasing when conservative courts strike
down a search. Finally, in the lower panels the estimated probabilities of granting certiorari-ranging
from about 10% to more than 80%-are very high, in
the context of known patterns about certiorari. For
example, the overall probability of granting certiorari
for search-and-seizure cases appealed to the Burger
Court was 7%.13

Parametric Fitting: The Signaling
Hypotheses
Bearing in mind that we model only one aspect of the
certiorari process, Table 1 presents empirical tests of
the theoretical model. As required by the theory, the
statistical models are switching regime regressions
(Goldfeld and Quandt 1973), which we estimate as
logistic regressions. The regimes are the same shown in
the critical conditioning plot in Figure 2. In models 1
13
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and 2, the slope in the lower right-hand panel is
estimated as a linear function of observed intrusiveness; in models 3 and 4 it is estimated as a step
function.
In all four models, the coefficient on the variable
admit is the intercept for cases in which the lower court
admitted the evidence. Admit:intrude is the slope
coefficient on the level of intrusiveness for the admitted
cases. Across all four models, these variables have
stable, statistically significant coefficients. It is straightforward to calculate the implied probabilities of granting certiorari, and these are shown in Figure 4 (using
model 4). In the top two panels of that figure, the
probability of the Supreme Court granting certiorari if
the lower court admitted the evidence is essentially
zero, except at the highest levels of intrusiveness,
where it increases to about 15%.
The patterns predicted when the lower court excluded the evidence are more complex, and the models
explore these patterns in some detail. In all four
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FIGURE 3.

Actual Patterns in the Data
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models, the variable exclude is the intercept for cases
in which the lower court excluded the evidence. In no
model is this term statistically significantly different
from zero, which indicates a baseline probability of
granting certiorari for these cases of approximately
50%. Model 1 allows the slope on intrusiveness to vary
linearly depending on the ideology of the lower court
(as measured by J1, the ideology of the opinion writer).
For liberal judges (J1 ' .1) the coefficient may take one
value; for conservative ones (J1 > .1) it may take
another. As shown in Table 1, if the lower court was
liberal, then the probability the Supreme Court would
grant certiorari was not affected by the level of intrusiveness. But if the lower court was conservative, then
the probability fell with the level of intrusiveness.14
14 Although our theoretical model explicitly calls for cut-points and
regime changes, estimating the model with the original interval-level
measurements for lower court ideology and the intrusiveness of the
search does not change the results. Rerunning model 1 yields the
following equation: .046 (1.08) - 6.56 (1.68) X Upheld - 0.19
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Model 2 is identical to model 1 but drops the
statistically insignificant variable that allowed intrusiveness to affect the probability of certiorari for cases with
evidence excluded by a liberal court. (The insignificance of this variable is compatible with the theory [see
the lower left-hand panel in Figure 2].) Excluding this
variable has only a very small effect on the overall fit of
the model, as shown in Table 1 by the residual deviance. In model 2, the predicted behavior of the Supreme Court varies dramatically depending on the
ideology of the lower court, given exclusion of the
evidence. If the lower court was liberal (J1 ? .1), then
the predicted probability of granting certiorari was
slightly more than 50% regardless of how intrusive the
search. If the lower court was conservative (J1 > .1),
then the probability declined dramatically with intru(0.36) X Intrude + 2.01 (2.23) X Ideology + 1.13 (0.50) x
(Upheld X Intrude) - 1.09 (0.71) X (Ideology X Intrude), with
standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 1. Probability of Granting Certiorari by Lower Court Decision and Intrusiveness of Search
(Logit Models)
Variable
Admit

Admit:intrude

Exclude

(Exclude & liberal):lntrude

(Exclude & conserv.):intrude

Model 1
-5.96
(1.27)
(-4.7)
0.73
(0.35)
(2.1)

Model 2
-5.96
(1.27)
(-4.7)
0.73
(0.35)
(2.1)

Model 3
-5.96
(1.27)
(-4.7)
0.73
(0.35)
(2.1)

Model 4
-5.96
(1.27)
(-4.7)
0.73
(0.35)
(2.1)

0.38
(1.03)
(0.4)
-0.14
(0.38)
(-0.4)
-0.58
(0.36)
(-1.6)

0.08
(0.62)
(0.1)

0.14
(1.06)
(0.1)
-0.07
(0.39)
(-0.2)

-0.01
(0.62)
(-0.02)

-1.72
(1.25)
(-1.4)
62.9
268

-1.57
(0.92)
(-1.7)
62.9
269

-0.49
(0.26)
(-1.9)

Step down (step at intrude = 1)

Residual deviance
Degrees of freedom

61.8
268

61.9
269

Note: In all cases, the dependent variable is the probability of granting certiorari. Standard error is given in first parenthesis, t value in second parenthesis.

siveness, falling to less than 10% for very intrusive
searches.15
Models 3 and 4 more directly test the theoretical
model by forcing the relationship in the lower righthand panel of the conditioning plots in Figure 2 to take
the form of a step function. We place the step at
intrude = 1 (similar results obtain when the step is
placed anywhere in the range 0-4). The step "down"
from the intercept is given in Table 1. Model 3, like
model 1, allows the probability of certiorari, given
exclusion by a liberal lower court, to vary with the
intrusiveness of the search. But as in model 1, this
variable is not statistically significantly different from
zero. Model 4 drops this term. Model 4 fits the data
only negligibly worse than models 1 and 2 (residual
deviance = 62.9).
The fit from model 4 is shown in Figure 4. As noted
above, the predicted probability of granting certiorari
for most upheld cases is zero and for liberal lower
courts that excluded the evidence is about 50%. As
shown in the lower left-hand panel of Figure 4, this
constant probability can now be seen as the upper step
in a step function. Among more conservative lower
courts that excluded the evidence (the lower right-hand
panel), the probability of review remains at about 50%
for less intrusive searches (the upper step in the step
function). For more intrusive searches, the probability
falls to about 18% (the lower step in the step function).
15The results are not sensitive to the exact location of the break
between more liberal and less liberal lower courts, that is, the results
are similar if the break falls anywhere between 0 and .3 on the
ideology scale.

Discussion
The patterns revealed by the statistical analysis and
shown in Figure 4 strongly resemble those predicted by
the signaling model. The dramatic difference between
the top and bottom rows in the figure confirms the
"Nixon goes to China principle." The more subtle
predictions, involving the location of the step, are
consistent with the lower panels.
Two discrepancies deserve brief discussion. First,
among cases in which the lower court admitted the
evidence, the probability of review rises slightly at the
highest levels of intrusiveness. If some of the lower
courts were more conservative than the Supreme
Court, then the model predicts this should not completely escape review for very intrusive searches. The
presence of some courts like this, or variables outside
the model, could account for the slight increase in
review probabilities at high levels of intrusiveness after
admission of the evidence. Second, the lower step in
the step function does not rest on zero but is located
somewhat higher. If more liberal courts are mistakenly
measured as less liberal, then this measurement error
(as well as variables outside the model) could lead to
an increase in the measured value for the lower step.

CONCLUSION
Our signaling theory of the Supreme Court's certiorari
decisions was tested against a random sample of cases
heard in the federal appellate courts. The theory is an
incomplete view of the process: It emphasizes the role
of certiorari in enforcing the doctrinal preferences of
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FIGURE 4.
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the Supreme Court throughout the judicial hierarchy
but ignores its important role in the evolutionary
creation of doctrine. The data are far from perfect. For
example, we rely on fairly crude measures of judicial
ideology and a relatively coarse coding of fact patterns
in the cases. Despite these shortcomings, which ought
to militate against finding patterns in the data, our
analysis uncovers considerable support for the signaling theory as well as support for a variety of new
propositions. Of course, we tested our model in only
one area of decision making during the reign of one
chief justice. Whether the data fit the model in other
areas and during other regimes remains to be seen.
Our research makes three contributions. First, we
use a formal model to advance our substantive understanding of certiorari. Most of the patterns uncovered
here are new, despite the extensive research on the
subject. We believe it unlikely that an analyst would
uncover the patterns shown in figures 3 and 4 without
a formal signaling model. Second, the research inte-
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grates the study of the judicial hierarchy with the "new
economics of organization" (Moe 1984). The application of formal principal-agent theory to the judicial
hierarchy yields several benefits, both within the field
of judicial politics and, more broadly, for the study of
political hierarchies. Within the field of judicial politics, two phenomena, hitherto regarded as distinct,
emerge as two components of a single underlying
process that can be analyzed in a unified way. The two
phenomena are judicial compliance (the responsiveness of lower courts to changes in the doctrinal directives of higher courts) and certiorari; both can be
treated as interactive components in a political struggle
over doctrine within the judicial hierarchy. From this
perspective, the problem of doctrinal control in the
judiciary is not sui generis but a particularlyinteresting
case of an issue common to rule-governed hierarchies.
To underscore the point, our model of strategic auditing, although tailored to the certiorari process, has
broader applicability to other hierarchical settings in
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which players have political preferences about rules.
Third, the research provides empirical support for a
formal model, which is still in relatively short supply.

rate property (MHRP) (under MHRP, if t' > t, then the
hazard rate at t' is greater than the hazard rate at t), as
assumed. Then, via the implicit function theorem,

APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition

1

Part 1 (x*X does not exist).
F(tb)
F(ta)

-

-

F(ta)/l

as

as

f(ta)[I

OXL

aXL

ax*

f(ta)[ 1 - F(tb)]

- F(tb)]
-

f(tb)[ 1 - F(ta)]

The numerator is positive. From the definitions of ta and tb,
> XL => tb > ta, which, using MHRP, in turn implies the
Q.E.D.
denominator is negative. (b) is obvious given (a).

XH

Note that the case deals with
<

F(ta)

ax*

k V

-

x. F(tb)

F(ta)/1

-

k V x cannot arise because
lim.,
F(tb)
-o
F(ta)/l - F(ta) = 0. This is true because ta, tb
- as x
-> oo. Thus, F(ta), F(tb)
-> 0 and 1 - F(ta)
-> 1 as
->o,
and the quotient goes to zero. For any nonzero k there must
exist a sufficiently large x so that F(tb) - F(ta)/l - F(ta) <
k. (A) Existence. If H does not review any cases, then the
indicated strategy for L is clearly a best response. By
assumption, F(tb) - F(ta)/1 - F(ta) < k V x when s(t, x) =
1 V X E [XL, XH). Then, from equation 2, r(exclude, x) = 0
V x. That r(admit; x) = 0 V x is discussed in the text. (B)
Uniqueness. There are three cases to consider, none of which
can be an equilibrium. (1) The indicated strategy for L, but
H reviews at least one case with probability greater than zero.
By construction, H can profitably deviate to the indicated
strategy. (2) The indicated strategy for H, but L deviates in
some fashion from deciding cases according to its preferred
rule. Then there are cases where L can profitably deviate to
the indicated strategy. (3) H reviews some cases with probability greater than zero, and L deviates from deciding cases
according to its preferred rule for at least one case in the
conflict region (i.e., ] x E [XL, XH) s't. s(t, x) < 1)
(deviations from the indicated strategy for L are never
profitable for cases below XL or above XH [inclusive] and need
not be considered further). By construction, the Bayesian
posterior >(XL C X C XH, exclude, x) < k when s(t, x) = 1
V X E [XL, XH). But >(XL
C X C XH, exclude, x) decreases
when s(t, x) < 1 for some x in the conflict region. Thus,
C X ? XH, exclude, x) remains less than k when s(t,
(XL
x) < 1 for some x in the conflict region, and therefore H can
profitably deviate to the strategy indicated in the proposition.
>

Part 2 (x* exists). By inspection, the strategies characterized
in part 2 comprise best responses: s * (t, x) is compatible with
BRL(r(m; x), t; x), and r*(mni, x) is compatible with
equation 2 and the requirement that r(m2, x) = 0 V x (the
latter is explained in the text).
Q.E.D.

Proof of Hypotheses
Follows immediately

1 and 2

from proposition

Proof of Hypothesis

1.

Q.E.D.

3

(a) We consider the case in which XL < XH; via symmetry,
similar arguments apply when XL > XH. Recall that x* is
defined implicitly by equation 3. The partial derivative of
equation 3 with respect to xV is
f(ta)

(

-

(F(ta)

-

f(tb)(l

F(tb))

-F(tb)

k

F(ta))

)2

1

-

k

which will be nonzero provided
f(ta)

f(tb)

1 -F(tj)

1 -F(tb)

that is, the hazard rate at

ta

is not equal to the hazard rate at

tb. A necessaryconditionfor this is thatXL 7& XH, whichwill
also be sufficient provided F displays the monotone hazard

Proof of Hypothesis 4
The argument is similar to that of hypothesis 3. Again
considering the case in which XL < XH, via the implicit
function theorem,

Of)

as

OXH

JXH

as
ax

-

- F(ta)]

f(tb)[l
f(tb) [I - F(tj)

0

f(tq) [ 1 - F(tb)

using MHRP. The other case follows via symmetry.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Hypothesis 5
As in hypotheses

4 and 5. For
ax*
Ok

-f(t,)II

XL

< XH

as

as

Ok ax *

[1 -F(ta)][F(tb)
-F(ta)]
- F(tj) ] - f(tb)[k(1
- k) + F(tj)

0

,

as the denominator is negative (provided 0 < k ? 1), and
the numerator is positive. The other case follows from
Q.E.D.
symmetry.
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